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This paper analyses the impact of refugee movements on emergency and
development aid allocation decisions of bilateral donors in a political economic
framework. We investigate two alternative hypotheses about donor motiva-
tions: ﬁrst, an altruistic burden-sharing policy towards recipient countries
that serve as hosts for a signiﬁcant refugee population, and second, a more
self-interested migration prevention policy focusing on recipient countries that
actually cause refugee movements. We ﬁnd some evidence that short-term
humanitarian aid is predominantly used for burden-sharing purposes towards
major refugee havens, while long-term development assistance is rather allo-
cated to the source countries either to prevent further refugee outﬂows or to
facilitate voluntary repatriation. Furthermore, it is evident that the inﬂow of
asylum seekers into donor countries leads to a reallocation of aid funds to the
respective countries of origin.
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11 Introduction
During the past decades, contributions of humanitarian and development aid have
multiplied. For instance, oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) to developing coun-
tries increased from USD 26.1 billion in 1960 to USD 106.8 billion in 2005 (OECD
2006). In the same period, refugee ﬂows have risen to a similar extent. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported 2.5 million refugees in
1970, by the end of 2004 this number had increased to 9.2 million (UNHCR 2005).
With rising numbers of forced migrants, the economic, social and political burdens
on ﬁrst asylum countries in the region or third asylum countries in the Western
world have grown tremendously. The objective of this paper is to link these two
developments and to investigate whether refugee movements have had any impact
on the allocation of both humanitarian and development aid.
Particularly since the European asylum crisis of the 1990s, policymakers search for
ways to relieve economic and social burdens borne by the neighboring regions of
conﬂict-ridden countries and to tackle the root causes of large refugee outﬂows. An
often discussed instrument to reach these objectives is inter alia the use of foreign
aid. However, the decision whether aid should be targeted towards countries of
origin or rather to ﬁrst asylum countries has been more subject to the policymakers
ideologies than to aid eﬃcacy considerations. The question whether aid works in
respect to migration management policies is still subject to a lively discussion.
Our objective is to focus on the aid allocation ideology of bilateral donors, that is
to reveal empirically two alternative aid policy approaches: burden-sharing towards
refugee host countries versus migration prevention strategies towards the source
countries. For investigating this, ﬁrstly, we examine whether developing countries
with a high economic or social burden are compensated through a heightened allo-
cation of humanitarian or development aid, and secondly, we test whether refugee
source countries receive increased aid volumes to tackle the root causes of refugee
ﬂights. Thirdly, we discuss whether aid allocation decisions of donor countries are
inﬂuenced by lobbying activities of asylum seekers in favor of their countries they
originate from.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in the next section we provide
2an extended review of both the aid allocation and forced migration literature. In
section 3, we derive our main hypotheses in a political economic framework. Sec-
tion 4 provides the respective empirical investigation for testing the hypotheses, we
derived theoretically in the previous section. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
2.1 Aid allocation and eﬀectiveness
Over the last three decades, a broad discussion about foreign aid allocation has
taken place. McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978) were among the ﬁrst to analyze bi-
lateral aid allocation with the distinction of donor self-interest and recipient need
variables. Since these early studies in the late 1970s, it has become common to
distinguish between these two sets. While the former primarily reﬂect donors’ self-
interests such as foreign aﬀairs objectives, the latter are more oriented towards the
economic or human needs of the recipient country. The most common variables
to control for donor self-interest are well-established trade relations, UN voting be-
havior (reﬂecting political similarity), geographical distance, military expenditures
or colonial ties. There is no consensus on the variables to be used and most stud-
ies control for a diﬀerent set of political, economic, military-strategic, and cultural
variables (Neumayer 2003d).
On the other hand, income per capita is the classical proxy for testing recipient
needs motivations. However, since this variable captures only individual monetary
aspects, other humanitarian (e.g. infant mortality, drinking water access, or literacy)
or economic determinants (e.g. external debt or inﬂation rate) are taken as well.
As the third major category of determinants, good governance variables control for
the political and institutional setting of the recipient country. The range of good
governance variables is rather broad, reaching from measures for democratic or au-
tocratic tendencies to the degree of freedom on civil, political and personal integrity
rights as well as corruption indices. Initially, models for donor self-interest and re-
cipient need were estimated separately to compare their inﬂuence on bilateral aid
allocation decisions (McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978), Maizels and Nissanke (1984),
3Tsoutsoplides (1991)). While in the early studies the donor self-interest model
mostly excels with more explanatory power, more recent analyses indicate a shift
towards the recipient need model (Grilli and Riess 1992). Later, it became common
to estimate hybrid models, which estimate both sets of the determinants simultane-
ously. Nevertheless, the main objective of all analyses is to reveal the underlying aid
giving motivation and to compare the magnitude of the diﬀerent categories (Dudley
and Montmarquette (1976), Maizels and Nissanke (1984), McGillivray (1989), Trum-
bull and Wall (1994), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Neumayer (2003d), Berth´ elemy and
Tichit (2004)).
Throughout the empirical literature, there exists fundamental evidence that donor
self-interest variables are the most important ones for determining bilateral aid allo-
cations. McKinlay and Little’s (1977, 1978) studies on the bilateral aid decisions of
major donors identify economic, political and security interests, as well as colonial
ties as the most inﬂuential factors. Developmental needs and political instability
have less or no priority in the aid decision making process. In Maizels and Nis-
sanke (1984), the importance of donors’ interests in terms of political and security
objectives, measured by the amount of arms transfers and a regional dummy, stand
out as signiﬁcant, whereas bilateral trade as an economic interest variable is found
to be insigniﬁcant. Tsoutsoplides (1991) estimates bilateral aid from the European
Community (EC) to 62 of the least developed countries. While he supports the
importance of the donor self-interests, that is trade relations and colonial links,
security interest variables deliver no signiﬁcant results. In most bilateral aid alloca-
tion analyses, colonial links are found to be of importance so that former colonies
receive a higher share of allocated aid(Dudley and Montmarquette (1976),Alesina
and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002), Neumayer (2003d)). Colonial ties
and trade relations as two of the most common donor self-interest variables that
are controlled for, predominantly indicate a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the allocation
of bilateral aid (Trumbull and Wall (1994), Neumayer (2003a, 2003b), Berth´ elemy
and Tichit (2004)). Together with political similarity measured e.g. by UN vot-
ing behavior, these political factors explain most of the cross country diﬀerences in
bilateral aid allocations (Alesina and Dollar 2000).
4On the other hand, the inﬂuence of recipient needs aspects on bilateral aid allocations
reveal a rather diﬀerent perspective. Although most donors give higher shares of
aid to poorer countries (Wall (1995), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Neumayer (2003d)),
the signiﬁcance of other need variables is less distinctive. For instance, it was not
until the late 1980s that development indicators and external debt began to show
relevance to aid allocation decisions (Grilli and Riess 1992). Berth´ elemy and Tichit
(2004) include primary school enrollment and infant mortality in their estimations
and show that its signiﬁcance is very volatile with respect to time and donor. Other
human needs variables show less or no impact on bilateral aid allocations, e.g. in
the work of Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and Neumayer (2003d).
Considering good governance rewarding, Alesina and Weder (2002) do not ﬁnd any
evidence that corrupt regimes receive less aid on an aggregated level. However,
disaggregation shows that Nordic countries tend to allocate more aid to less cor-
rupt countries whereas the opposite seems true for the US. Furthermore, Svensson
(2000) ﬁnds no evidence that donors systematically disfavor more corrupt recipi-
ent countries. With respect to the quality and security of political and civil rights
in the aid receiving countries, Neumayer (2003b, 2003c) proves that most donors
take these individual rights into account when deciding upon aid giving.1 Alesina
and Dollar (2000) as well as Neumayer (2003d) provide evidence of good governance
(democracy) rewarding eﬀects, even though Berth´ elemy and Tichit (2004) state that
political attitudes are less important since the end of the Cold War than during it.
Generally, donor preferences for poverty alleviation, or the promotion of democracy
and human rights, diﬀer largely between the donor states. For instance, the more
like-minded Nordic countries claim to give self-interest less signiﬁcance than others
when allocating aid. Gates and Hoeﬄer (2004) underline this by providing evidence
that Nordic donor states favor recipient countries that are more democratic, poorer
and exhibit more respect for human rights.
While studies on development aid allocations are quite numerous, research on emer-
gency aid allocations is rather poor. Since it is distributed in urgent situations like
1Neumayer’s results are generally in line with other analyses on this issue, like e.g. the study
of Apodaca and Stohl (1999) for the US aid allocation.
5violent conﬂicts, draughts or earthquakes, where basic requirements of the popula-
tion need to be satisﬁed very rapidly and often only for a short-term, the allocation
of emergency aid is (or, should be) particularly based on the basic needs of the
recipient’s population instead of alternative donor interests.
With regard to our later analysis on migration prevention policies, we will now
discuss the eﬀectiveness of aid in reducing poverty, promoting democracy, and ac-
celerating economic growth (Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), McGillivray
(2003)). Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that good policies is a necessary condi-
tion for aid to be eﬀective in promoting growth and reducing poverty. Examining
the eﬀect of aid ﬂows with respect to policy conditions, they claim that aid does not
systematically inﬂuence recipient policies. Therefore, they conclude that aid is most
eﬀective when systematically conditioned on sound economic policies. In their study,
Collier and Dollar (2002) show that, for a given level of poverty and in a fragile to
moderate policy environment, aid allocation is positively correlated to policy. How-
ever, this impact decreases in a moderate to good policy climate. Thus, although
the eﬀectiveness of aid would increase, the amount of aid allocated declines.2 Other
studies also have emphasized that aid spurs growth (Hansen and Tarp (2001), Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2002)), but that it is not necessarily conditional on good policies. The
presumption that aid is only eﬀective in a good policy environment has been widely
disputed (Easterly (2003), Ovaska (2003)). Quibria (2005) reveals a discrimination
against poorer countries with the least capacity for good governance structures, that
is those countries where aid is needed most. Obviously, such selectivity strategies are
constraint by diminishing returns to scale, and respectively, the absorption capaci-
ties of the recipient country (McGillivray 2003). However, Collier and Dollar (2002)
indicate that the absorptive capacity is positively correlated with the institutional
level of the recipient country.
Evidence for the impact of foreign aid on human development indicators is rather
inconsistent. Generally, most studies on aid eﬀectiveness ponder rather on economic
2Collier and Dollar (2001) suggest a poverty-eﬃcient allocation rule, that is a higher share of aid
should be allocated to poorer and larger countries with a better policy environment, which could
pull about twenty million people out of poverty annually by reallocating the disposable amount of
aid, in contrast to ten million raised out of poverty with the current allocation.
6development indicators such as growth or income per capita than on human devel-
opment variables. McGillivray (2003) surveys recent literature with a focus on aid
allocation that maximizes poverty reduction. He identiﬁes a range of poverty reduc-
ing criteria on which aid selectivity should be based upon in addition to income per
capita and the quality of policy, as for example, political stability (Chauvet 2003),
economic vulnerability (Casella and Eichengreen 1996) or post-conﬂict situations
(Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), Kang and Meernik (2004)).
The basic insight of reviewing the aid eﬀectiveness literature is that aid generally
works, but that the degree of eﬀectiveness depends strongly on country-speciﬁc con-
ditions (McGillivray 2003). Based on this, we now introduce a new issue -migration
policy- into the context of bilateral aid allocation decisions. We subsequently provide
a brief review of the literature on refugee burden-sharing and migration manage-
ment policies. This outlines the need for an analysis of aid allocation motivations
of bilateral donors investigating altruism and self-interest with respect to refugee
movements.
2.2 Refugee Burden-Sharing and Migration Management
The 1951 Geneva Convention deﬁnes a refugee as an individual, who owing to a
”[...] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, [...] and is unwilling to return to it.”
The interpretation and implementation of this convention is contingent on the
country where an asylum application is placed. However, the principle of ’non-
refoulement’ denies the signing countries the right to refuse protection to asylum
seekers, even when refugee status is not granted.3 Though the general classiﬁcation
3Many individuals who are not granted refugee status according to Article 1, may still not
be deterred as Article 33 declares that ”no contracting state shall expel or return (’refouler’) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.”
7of refugee status has not changed in the past decades, the number of persons seek-
ing protection has multiplied until recently (Widgren (1989), Schuck (1997), Hatton
(2004)). Since the end of the Cold War, refugees have originated predominantly
from the Southern hemisphere. Although refugee movements have become increas-
ingly intercontinental, the majority of these displaced people remains in the region
of origin (Hatton and Williamson (2005)). However, as the distinction between le-
gitimate and illegitimate refugees becomes more and more delicate, the reasons for
emigration became increasingly blurred. Rotte, Vogler, and Zimmermann (1997)
diﬀerentiate between the two interwoven strands of economic and political determi-
nants. They ﬁnd some evidence that decreasing per-capita income gaps between the
country of origin and the intended country of asylum, and an increasing absolute
level of per-capita income, reduce both emigration pressures. Furthermore, dimin-
ishing political oppression in the country of origin and increasing restrictiveness of
immigration law in the host country lessens migration propensities.4 In contrast,
Gosh (1992) delivers evidence that improving economic conditions along with po-
litical reforms may initially lead to a rise in emigration, while on a higher level the
desire to leave the home country decreases. However, neither Hatton (2004) nor
Neumayer (2005) or Rotte, Vogler, and Zimmermann (1997) ﬁnd any evidence of
such a ‘migration hump’. Generally interested in the prevention of asylum immi-
gration, and simultaneously, to uphold the solidarity with those most vulnerable
people, Western asylum countries are confronted with a balancing act between hu-
man aspects and self-interests. By distinguishing diﬀerent determinants for refugee
ﬂows, there are three potential dimensions of migration management policies West-
ern countries could adopt: ﬁrst, emigration pressures could be lessened through
generous development assistance for reducing economic hardships, second, immigra-
tion laws could be designed, implemented and enforced more restrictive, and third,
the political conditions in the source countries could be ameliorated by improving
human rights observance or the implementation of democratic and good governance
structures (Widgren (1989), Neumayer (2005)).
4Hatton (2004) and Neumayer (2005) emphasize the importance of economic hardship as well
as the signiﬁcance of political oppression, violent conﬂict and human rights abuses.
8Since the largest part of the global refugee population is hosted in other neigh-
boring developing countries and only a small share ﬁnds refuge in Western asylum
countries, many (mostly African) countries perceive that they shoulder a dispro-
portionate burden of hosting refugees in relation to the international community
(UNHCR (2004), Betts (2004)). As this inequality in the distribution of displaced
persons is eminent and not deniable, an alternative and more altruistic aid policy
approach focuses on a burden-sharing between Western donor (and potential third
asylum) countries and Southern ﬁrst asylum countries. However, measuring and
sharing the net costs for refugees ﬁnancially are rather diﬃcult, since the ’refugee
burden’ includes economic, political, social and even cultural costs and beneﬁts
(Vink and Meijerink 2003). Generally, two policy approaches are discussed to ad-
dress an unequal distribution of refugees: ﬁrst, resource-sharing in terms of sharing
the ﬁnancial costs of hosting refugees, which could mean money transfers as well
as provision of technical or logistic assistance, and second, responsibility-sharing in
terms a reallocation of refugees between countries based on the principle of double
voluntarism: the third country of asylum and the asylum seeker himself should both
agree on the resettlement (Noll 2003).
Obviously, burden-sharing and migration management strategies are interwoven to
some extent. Schuck (1997) identiﬁes the root cause strategy, the repatriation strat-
egy, the temporary protection strategy, and permanent resettlement as the main
options to cope with refugee ﬂows. Hereby, the root cause strategy is the most
proactive, but also intricate, approach for managing refugee ﬂows, since it is aimed
at preventing or resolving a speciﬁc crisis. The complexity arises from relieving the
political, economic, environmental or cultural conditions that prompt refugees to
ﬂee their homes and countries. As complicated as it may seem to identify the causes
of migration, even more complex is the task to tackling them. Due to national
sovereignty of the aﬀected countries and an often observed reluctance to cooper-
ate, the options for intervention are constrained to economic instruments such as
development aid, investment, or trade. Although the inﬂuence of intervention on
the root causes of emigration and the success of altering deeply rooted political
and economic grievances in the country of origin are rather limited (Byrne 2003),
9the previous section showed that development assistance is under certain conditions
eﬀective in promoting economic progress, and short-term emergency aid eases the
consequences of the diﬀerent forms of humanitarian disasters. It is shown by Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2002) that even if aid does not alter the level of policy, aid enhances
economic growth, which indirectly reduces conﬂict risk and consequently lowers the
propensity to emigrate.
The remaining three strategies are rather reactive measures for tackling refugee
ﬂows, in that they deal with the situation after the refugees have left their home
countries in order to seek protection in a country granting them either refugee sta-
tus, temporary protection status or a permission to stay permanently. Hereby, the
repatriation strategy is generally the preferred option by the host country, since the
refugees return to their home countries as soon as possible. However, repatriation
is often not possible for years due to the aftermaths of civil conﬂicts. Most internal
conﬂicts arise and are enlivened by ethnic, religious or economic disputes that de-
generate into violent conﬂicts between and among diﬀerent societal groups. These
consequences of such clashes do often not cease completely, even if the direct men-
ace of persecution disappears. Therefore, refugees often await repatriation for a long
period until the conditions responsible for the ﬂight from the home country have
been remedied.5 For many asylum countries, providing temporary protection status
is more attractive than granting full refugee status according to the UN Refugee
Convention. This is because the duration and the standards of treatment are not
regulated and therefore present a possibility of diminished obligations (Fitzpatrick
2000). Resettlement is the least used option for managing migration ﬂows, as many
countries fear receiving disproportionate numbers of refugees.6 The decrease in re-
settled refugees is mainly caused by an increased domestic pressure to lower the
5UNHCR (2005) reports that in 2004 about 1.5 million refugees repatriated, which is a relatively
small share as the people of concern to the UNHCR reached a total number of 20 million people
at the beginning of 2004. Despite being the preferred solution to refugee ﬂows, the approach is
accompanied by some severe challenges in reintegrating returnees (Harrell-Bond (1989), Rogge and
Akol (1989), Rogers (1992).
6The total number of resettlements is extremely small (around 30.000 people in 2004) compared
to the total stock of refugees (UNHCR 2005).
10admission rates, compassion fatigue with the ever growing numbers of refugees, and
rising social costs of integrating persons with completely diﬀerent cultural heritages
in third asylum countries (Stein (1986), Boswell (2003)). However, Western coun-
tries are rather heterogenous in their refugee and asylum policies, and the total
number of refugees resettled varies widely across countries (Schuck 1997).
Based upon the implications of these two policy ﬁelds, we subsequently analyze
the inﬂuence of refugee movements on bilateral aid allocations more thoroughly. In
the next section, we derive the main hypotheses to be tested later on in a political
economic framework.
3 Model analysis
For modeling aid allocation with respect to burden-sharing or migration prevention
motives we assume three countries: an aid-donating country d, a conﬂict-torn coun-
try of origin o, and a (neighboring) refugee-hosting ﬁrst asylum country a. Initially,
we assume the population in the donor country d to be homogeneous. However,
there are two groups of individuals in each recipient country, which are labeled 1
and 2, respectively. In the refugee-hosting ﬁrst asylum country a, group a1 reﬂects
the refugee population coming from country o, and group a2 contains the native pop-
ulation. In the conﬂict-torn country o, group o1 contains the persecuted (by ethnic,
religious, political, or other reasons) sub-population, and group o2 reﬂects the re-
maining, non-persecuted sub-population. The sizes of the respective sub-populations
of each country are given by Ld,Lo1,Lo2,La1,La2. For reasons of simplicity, we shall
assume Ld=1.
3.1 Burden-Sharing Motives
We assume that people in the donor country are altruistic only towards the refugee
sub-population a1 in the ﬁrst asylum country a.7 Before tax-ﬁnanced lump-sum
aid transfers are made, per-capita (factor) incomes are exogenously given by ¯ Yi for
7For this method of modeling altruism, see e.g. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2004).
11i = d,o1,o2,a1,a2.8 The per-capita utility level, ud, of the donor is then given by
the following functional form:
ud = Vd + λa(La1ua1), (1)
where Vd is the indirect utility derived from net income, ua1 is the per-capita utility
of the hosted refugees in recipient country a, and λa is the altruism parameter. The
total amount of aid directed towards this recipient country is given by Ta. How-
ever, the native population in country a lobby their national government to obtain
a proportion of the received aid transfers. Aid allocation between the two respective
sub-populations is endogenously determined with µa as the share allocated to the
refugee sub-population a1. Thus, the recipient government decides upon the aid
share directed towards the donors’ intended purpose. When deciding upon alloca-
tion, the recipient government needs to take into consideration possible sanctions
by the donor, which may lower the total amount of aid.
We assume that aid is distributed as a lump-sum transfer among the hosted refugees,
and it is ﬁnanced in the donor country by lump-sum taxation. Then, the per-capita
utility of the individuals in the donor country and those of the targeted refugee
population in the recipient country are given by
ud = Vd[ ¯ Yd − Ta] + λa(La1ua1), (2)




For all subsequent model variations we assume positive and diminishing marginal
utilities of net income. The above equations imply that the net income in the donor
country is equal to its factor income minus the given aid amount. In the recipient
country, the net income of the refugees is equal to their factor income plus the pro-
portion of the aid they receive.
The aid allocation parameter µa is the policy instrument of the government in the
ﬁrst asylum country and it is determined endogenously in the political equilibrium.
8Factor prices do not vary in this analysis, because all countries are assumed to be small in
the international goods market, commodity prices are determined exogenously, factors are inter-
nationally immobile and inelastically supplied, and refugees are considered as not integrated into
domestic labor markets.
12The following speciﬁcation of the political equilibrium is based upon Dixit, Gross-
man, and Helpman (1997) and Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2004). Refugees in
the ﬁrst asylum country are not able to lobby, however, native residents make con-
tributions to the government to partake the aid funds. The contribution schedule is
then denoted by
Ga = ρaca + (La1ua1 + La2ua2), (4)
with ρa as a ’corruption’ parameter expressing the weight the government gives to
lobbying funds compared to maximizing social welfare. The political equilibrium
is an outcome of a two-stage game. The natives choose their contribution sched-
ule before the government sets its policy parameter µa. A political equilibrium is
then determined by the optimal contribution schedule c∗(µa). This maximizes the
welfare of the natives given the anticipated optimization by the government, and
the policy parameter µ∗ that maximizes the government’s objective function given
the contribution schedule.9 Thus, when the natives lobby, the recipient government




which equalizes the beneﬁt of allocating a marginal unit of aid to the refugee sub-
population with the marginal loss in lobbying contributions. From diﬀerentiating
(5), it follows that an increase in Ta or a decrease in La1, would reduce the equilibrium















We assume that the donor and the recipient country act simultaneously. This implies
that both governments choose their policy instrument optimally by taking the other’s
policy choice as given. While the choice of the recipient government is given by (5),








where µ∗ has been taken as given. This equation states that the amount of aid is
determined by equalizing the marginal costs and beneﬁts of aid giving, the latter
9See the Appendix A for a speciﬁcation of the political equilibrium.
13being the marginal utility of a refugee, discounted by the degree of altruism and
the proportion of aid targeted to the refugee sub-population. Equations (5) and (6)
determine simultaneously the optimal values for the policy instruments Ta and µa.
By diﬀerentiating (5) and (6) with respect to these two parameters, we obtain the










a1 − V 00
d Ta)
> 0. (7)
This implies that a refugee inﬂow, i.e. dLa1 > 0, would increase both the proportion
of aid going to the refugee sub-population and the total amount of bilateral aid
transfers.
Proposition 1 Burden-sharing motive
If both, the ﬁrst asylum and recipient country as well as the donor country, act
simultaneously in their choice of the respective aid allocation parameter, an inﬂow
of refugees to the ﬁrst asylum country increases both the total amount of aid received
from the donor country and the proportion channeled to the refugee sub-population.
3.2 Migration Prevention Interests
In an alternative migration policy approach, the donor government is interested in
a reduction of the emigration pressure in the conﬂict-torn country of origin and the
promotion of repatriation incentives for refugees in neighboring asylum countries.
This policy is rooted in the fear that refugees will make a secondary movement
towards the donor country. For modeling this, we adjust the previous model speci-
ﬁcation in some points. We assume that a donor country with migration prevention
interests focus on the well-being of the total stock of potential refugees in the coun-
try of origin ¯ Lo1, and not only on the remaining non-persecuted population Lo1 as
the government of country o. Then, equations (2) and (4) adjust according to:
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] + Lo2uo2. (9)











The following comparative static result is derived by diﬀerentiating both equations




















From equation (12), we can see that the total amount of bilateral aid transferred to
the refugee-sending country o increases due to migration prevention interests of the
donor country if and only if the following condition is true:
dTo
dLo1









This condition states that if the initial amount of aid channeled to a potential refugee
(
µoTo
¯ Lo1 ) is relatively large, or alternatively, the relative risk aversion of the potential
refugee is relatively large, the donor country will increase its total bilateral aid
transfers toward the refugee-sending country when refugees ﬂee.
Proposition 2 Migration prevention interests
If both, the refugee-sending and recipient country as well as the donor country, act
simultaneously in their choice of the respective aid allocation parameter, an outﬂow
of refugees from the conﬂict-torn recipient country increases the total amount of







¯ Lo1 > 1.
3.3 Lobbying by Asylum Seekers
Finally, we analyze, and also test in section 4, whether refugees and asylum seekers
who entered the donor country act as lobbyists in the aid allocation process for the
beneﬁt of their conﬂict-torn home country o. For this, we assume that some of the
refugees from country o do not only move to the ﬁrst asylum country a, but move
on and apply for asylum in the donor country d. There, they engage in lobbying
activities for the sake of their persecuted compatriots in their home country. This
15implies that refugees and asylum seekers play the role of information and urgency
transmitters, which might enhance the ’willingness’ of the donor country to increase
bilateral aid transfers towards the country of origin (Czaika 2005).
If we assume that the share τod of the refugees, who originate from the conﬂict-torn
country o, live as asylum seekers in the donor country d, the objective function of
the donor government is given by
max
To
W = ud + τod(¯ Lo1 − Lo1)uod1 (14)




The welfare maximizing condition for the donor government is derived from (14):





Taking the total diﬀerential of both conditions (10) and (15) and solving simulta-
neously, the following comparative static expression results:
dTo
dLo1






Proposition 3 Lobbying activities of asylum seekers
If both, the refugee-sending and recipient country as well as the donor country, act
simultaneously in their choice of the respective aid allocation parameter, an inﬂow
of asylum seekers into the donor country increases the total amount of bilateral aid
transferred to the refugee-sending country.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we empirically test the previously derived propositions. We ana-
lyze whether bilateral aid allocation decisions are characterized by implicit burden-
sharing agreements -aid for refugee burden compensation- between refugee-hosting
developing countries and Western donor countries, or alternatively, whether bilat-
eral aid is rather used by donor countries as an instrument to manage migration
ﬂows with respect to the country of origin. The estimation equation can be formally
described as follows:
yit = α + βitX
0
it + uit i = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,n. (17)
16Bilateral aid transfer y is estimated as a dependent variable by the constant α, the
independent variable set X, β as the corresponding vector of coeﬃcients and the
error term u. The expected value of the latter is assumed to be zero and uncorrelated
with the independent variables. The index i speciﬁes the aﬃliation of the variable
with a country, t indicates the observed time period. One problem in estimating
foreign aid allocation is the nature of the dependent variable, i.e. the amount of aid
allocated. Aid selectivity produces a bias in the dependent variable, since the data
are non-linear and a proportionally large share of observation points is clustered at
the value zero. The literature provides diﬀerent estimation techniques to account for
non-linearity and the existence of a positive probability mass at the value zero for
the dependent variable (Apodaca and Stohl (1999), Neumayer (2003d), Berth´ elemy
and Tichit (2004)).10
For instance, the Tobit model estimates the allocation of aid in one step and includes
only the positive values. This property is restrictive, since it assumes that the vari-
ables, which determine aid eligibility, also inﬂuence the amount of aid allocated and
the coeﬃcient is of the same sign for both stages. Therefore, the Tobit model is not
used and we diﬀerentiate between the eligibility stage and the level stage regarding
the respective inﬂuence of the explanatory variables. The Heckman model estimates
the two stages simultaneously with diﬀering variable speciﬁcations. However, to re-
ceive unbiased estimation results, an exclusion variable is needed which aﬀects on
the one hand aid eligibility, but has on the other hand no inﬂuence on aid levels.
Since an appropriate variable with this characteristic is not at hand, the Heckman
model is not applied. Therefore, in the present study we employ the two-part model,
which estimates the two stages separately. This can be formally described as follows:
yi|z
∗
i > 0 = β + β1X1i + u1i i = 1,...,N (18)
z
∗
i = β + β2X2i + u2i i = 1,...,N (19)
with yi = y
∗
i and zi = 1 if z
∗
i > 0,
yi = 0 and zi = 0 otherwise,
and 0 = Cov(u1i,u2i).
10For a discussion on sample-selection versus two-part model approach, see e.g. Manning, Duan,
and Rogers (1987), Leung and Yu (1996), or Puhani (2000).
17The two equations are treated as independent, assuming that the correlation of
the error terms is zero. Even though both equations are estimated independently,
the level stage regression (18) is estimated with the subsample deemed eligible for
receiving aid. The eligibility stage (19) is estimated with a logistic regression with
z∗
i as the binary choice variable.
Our sample contains 18 donor countries and 148 recipient countries covering the
years from 1992 to 2003. We run a ﬁxed eﬀects model to control for country-speciﬁc
heterogeneity eﬀects, which might not be captured by the model speciﬁcation. As
donor decisions on aid allocations and the actual aid transfers are predominantly
not settled in the same year, the variables enter with a one-year time lag. This
shall also reduces potential simultaneity problems. Furthermore, we use logarithms
for the dependent as well as for some of the independent variables for capturing
non-linearity eﬀects. Estimation results are reported with standard errors which are
robust towards arbitrary heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
4.1 Data
Data on oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) are provided by the Development As-
sistance Committee of the OECD. ODA is characterized by its composition of grants
and highly concessional loans, the objective of promoting economic development and
welfare, and its distribution by the oﬃcial sector.11 We use gross disbursements in-
stead of commitments, since they reﬂect the aid volume actually transferred to the
recipient country.12 Furthermore, we use shares of total ODA, instead of aid per
11Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven (1999) discuss the many shortcomings of the oﬃcial
development aid data from the OECD which include the underestimation of the aid content, the
over-representation of loans with high concessionality, as well as the constant interest rate of 10 % to
calculate the grant element of the highly concessional loans. Thus, they develop the aid measure
EDA (eﬀective development assistance) to eliminate most of the failures of ODA. However, as
Ovaska (2003) shows that both ODA and EDA yield essentially the same results, we use standard
ODA measures.
12Neumayer (2003d) states that gross data are non-negative and conceptually closer to commit-
ments than net ODA disbursements, but the problem with gross data is that parts of the amounts
disbursed are not at the country’s unrestricted disposal, as they are used to repay current loans.
18capita, to reﬂect the aid allocation decision making process of the donor government
more realistically (Neumayer 2003d).
Data on emergency aid disbursements are provided by the Creditor Reporting Sys-
tem (CRS) of the OECD. Since emergency aid features some diﬀerent characteristics
compared to oﬃcial development assistance, the dependent variable is deﬁned by
emergency aid per capita and not by cross-country shares.
The core explanatory variables used for measuring the eﬀect of refugee migration
on humanitarian and development aid allocations are provided by UNHCR. We use
data on refugee stocks, which capture the number of persons recognized as refugees
according to the 1951/67 Geneva Convention. We deﬁne two alternative variables
to test for refugee burden-sharing: ﬁrst, the refugee burden (gdp) variable, as the
number of refugees divided by the host country’s GDP, shall reﬂect the economic
burden placed on the refugee-hosting country, and second, the refugee burden (p.c.)
variable, as the number of hosted refugees relative to the population of the recipient
country, shall rather proxy the social and political costs for the host country. For
testing migration management interests of donor countries, we use refugee stock (per
capita) variable, which indicates the stock of ﬂed refugees in proportion to the source
country’s total population. We assume that this variable proxies both political as
well as economic grievances in the country of origin. We argue that the higher the
share of sent refugees, the higher the allocation of aid to this country in order to
stabilize the conditions there, so that emigration abates and repatriation becomes
a real option for refugees. To investigate the lobbying approach, we create two
alternative variables. First, the asylum applications (donor) variable captures the
number of asylum applications submitted to a donor country by persons of a speciﬁc
sending country as a ratio of the donor country’s population. This variable shall
serve as a proxy for a bilateral migration pressure exerted by the source on the donor
country. We presume that the more asylum seekers enter the donor country, the
higher the lobbying eﬀorts to allocate more aid to the source country. We apply the
asylum applications (recipient) variable as an alternative measure for the donor’s
bilateral asylum burden. Here, asylum applications are set relative to the source
country’s population, which reﬂects the special need for bilateral responsibility and
19interest of the donor to tackle the root causes in the refugee-sending and aid-receiving
country.
Concerning other control variables, they are roughly divided into donor self-interest,
recipient need and good governance variables.13 The bilateral trade variable proxies
major commercial interests of the donor. It is deﬁned by goods and services ex-
ported to the recipient country as share of total exports. Hereby, we assume that
larger trade volumes result in larger aid amounts. Although there may exist an en-
dogeneity bias due to aid-tying, Lloyd, Morrissey, and Osei (2001) ﬁnd no evidence
that tied aid increases trade.14 Furthermore, as a proxy for economic openness, we
include the recipient country’s total imports and exports as a share of its GDP into
our regression.15 We assume that the more a recipient economy is integrated into
international trade, the more aid it will received from donors. For taking into ac-
count the economic potential, total population of the recipient country is included,
assuming that larger countries receive more aid. The distance variable shall capture
the economic, political and cultural proximity measured as geographical distance
between the donor and recipient country. The further away the recipient country is,
the lower are the economic and political spill-overs into the donors’ interest spheres.
An often used variable is the colonial background of the recipient country. Since colo-
nial ties create closeness between former colonies and the donor country in terms
of country-speciﬁc political, economic and cultural linkages, it is reasonable that
donors allocate more aid to their former colonies. In order to control for cultural
and religious similarity and dissimilarity, respectively, the share of Christian and
Muslim population, respectively, living in the recipient country are used as prox-
ies. Since almost all donor countries in the sample are predominantly Christian, we
presume that the former enters with a positive sign, contrary to the latter variable,
which is assumed to have a negative inﬂuence on the transferred amount of aid. the
13All variables and the information on their composition and sources are provided in the Ap-
pendix B.
14Since the correlation between the two variables (0.13) is relatively small, potential aid and
trade simultaneity should not exert too much inﬂuence on the estimation results.
15The correlation between the trade and the openness variables is relatively small (0.15), hence,
an endogeneity problem should not be present.
20years of ODA variable emphasizes the partnership between the aid-receiving and the
aid-allocating country.16 We assume that long-lasting development assistance rela-
tionships result, ceteris paribus, in higher amounts of aid due to the well-established
knowledge of the recipient’s policy and institutions, current projects, established
contacts and personnel already present in the country. The external debt variable
measures the total debt of the recipient country as a percentage of GDP.17 Basically,
the external debt can be categorized both as a donor interest and a recipient need
variable.
The most common recipient need variable is income (per capita), which approximates
the economic needs of the recipient country’s population. For lowering economic
hardships, more aid is transferred. However, as income per capita is evident to be
deﬁcient to measure basic human needs, the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is
additionally included as a proxy for human well-being in a recipient country (Morris
(1979), Moon (1991)).18 The determinant natural disasters deaths is only included
in the estimation of emergency aid. We use it as a proxy for the immediate basic
needs after a natural catastrophe. It measures deaths by natural disasters as a share
of the total population, such as droughts, famines or earthquakes. Obviously, the
allocation of emergency aid is expected to correspond positively to the extent of a
calamity.
Good governance is controlled for by the democracy variable, which reﬂects the
16We simply counted the number of years a country has received ODA from 1960 until 1991. As
there are a number of countries which achieved independence later than 1960, these were added
from the date of their independence.
17An often emerging problem of including external debt in a regression is the poor data availabil-
ity. However, the availability of good data has improved signiﬁcantly, as the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank (WB) operate a new joint database on
external debt.
18Morris (1979) develops the PQLI as an aggregate measure of infant mortality, literacy and
life expectancy. All three variables are transformed to a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best), after
which the average is taken. The PQLI is preferred the Human Development Index (HDI), since
the latter is available for fewer countries, and additionally, income per capita is not a component
of the PQLI.
21quality of the recipient country’s democratic structures (e.g. competitiveness in
elections, regulation of participation, or openness of executive recruitment). As
most donors are committed to the promotion of better democratic institutions, the
size of aid transfers is assumed to be larger for higher levels of democracy. A proxy
for political fragility and instability of the recipient country is taken into account
by the number of battle deaths resulting directly from violence inﬂicted through the
use of armed forces. Armed conﬂicts destabilize the political and economic environ-
ment, which results in major failures of governments to insure the basic needs of the
population. Although interpretable as a recipient needs variable, we presume that
the share of allocated aid will decline with higher numbers of battle deaths. The
argument states that donors are generally not eager to support politically fragile
states, and moreover, development assistance becomes more delicate in conﬂicting
countries. Since this variable indicates immediate instability, we use it solely for the
emergency aid regression. As an alternative good governance variable capturing hu-
man rights aspects, we use the personal integrity rights data recorded in the political
terror scales (PTS).19 The PTS measures basic human rights, such as occurrences
of torture, political imprisonment and murder.20
4.2 Results
Tables 1 and 2 provide the results for the eligibility and the level stage estimation
on ODA, respectively. For the eligibility stage, bilateral trade displays a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient supporting the hypothesis that trade relations between the
19The PTS is ranked on a scale of one to ﬁve, where one is the category with the least frequency
of torture and political imprisonment and ﬁve describes the worst conditions for the population
under the predominating regime including regularly torture and murder.
20The other commonly used variable is the civil and political rights indices from Freedom House,
which indicate e.g. the freedom to form political parties and to compete for leading positions in
government, as well as liberty with respect to religious, ethnic and personal freedoms. However, we
use the PTS variable, instead of the political and civil rights indices, for statistical reasons. The
joint variable on civil and political rights is highly correlated with both the democracy variable and
the PTS, whereas the correlation between the PTS and the democracy determinant is negligible,
therefore the latter two variables are included. Nevertheless, we use the civil and political rights
measure for a robustness check.
22Table 1: Logit: Dependent Variable: ODA, 1992-2003
I II III IV V
Trade 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(5.05) (5.11) (5.13) (6.26) (6.15)
External Debt 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(4.89) (4.97) (4.97) (5.22) (5.31)
Distance -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.23*** -0.26***
(-10.60) (-10.55) (-10.57) (-7.75) (-7.80)
% Christians 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*
(1.75) (1.66) (1.74) (1.92) (1.81)
% Muslims -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-3.27) (-3.28) (-3.28) (-3.16) (-3.24)
Colonial Ties 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.28***
(3.23) (3.21) (3.21) (2.73) (2.73)
Years of ODA 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.000 0.000
(2.03) (2.123 (2.18) (0.07) (-0.11)
Population 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(29.38) (28.38) (29.10) (27.67) (27.64)
Income (p.c.) -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.29***
(-8.71) (-8.27) (-8.57) (-9.66) (-9.63)
PQLI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.88) (-0.81) (-0.52) (-1.25) (-1.24)
Democracy 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(7.72) (7.83) (7.80) (7.97) (8.00)
Human Rights 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(3.34) (2.79) (2.78) (3.85) (3.89)
Openness -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 -0.02
(-1.40) (-1.52) (-1.77) (-1.54) (-1.50)
Refugee Burden (political) 2.04
(0.75)
Refugee Burden (economic) 143.0
(1.57)
Refugee Outﬂow (stock) 5.78* 5.91*
(1.71) (1.75)
Asylum Applic. (donor) -1.09***
(-3.93)
Asylum Applic. (recipient) -1.96***
(-2.96)
Observations 21015 21015 21015 20228 20228
Log Likelihood -9209.26 -9207.4 -9206.38 -8694.86 -8702.01
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Notes: The z-values are in parentheses. */**/*** Signiﬁcant at 10%/ 5%/1% level.
donor and the recipient country aﬀect aid eligibility. A similar positive inﬂuence is
reported for the degree of external debt. Geographical distance inﬂuences the donors’
aid eligibility decision negatively. Contrarily, bilateral relationships, expressed by
colonial ties and the number of years of bilateral development cooperation, have
a positive impact on the aid allocation decision. Cultural similarities show the
expected signs, though cultural similarity is signiﬁcant only at the ten percent level,
23whereas countries with a high share of Muslims are less probable to receive aid.
Throughout the diﬀerent regressions, poorer and larger countries are more likely
to receive aid. The PQLI coeﬃcients show the expected negative sign, but exert
no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the donor’s decision to allocate aid at all. Countries
with a higher level of democratic structures are more likely to receive aid than
those with autocratic tendencies. Securing human rights is not rewarded, quite
the contrary, the coeﬃcients consistently exhibit positive signs. On the eligibility
stage, economic as well as social burdens resulting from refugee hosting in recipient
countries do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the binary aid allocation decision of
donors. Both variables controlling for burden-sharing motivations do not have any
signiﬁcant eﬀect, even though they display the expected sign. On the other hand,
migration preventive interests, controlled for by the stock of refugee outﬂow, displays
some weak signiﬁcance. Asylum applications are reported with a negative impact
on the aid eligibility choice of the donor. The more asylum applications that have
been submitted to the donor country, the less eligible the source country is to receive
aid. That is, the higher the migration pressure on the donor country, the less likely
the source country is to receive aid at all.
For the level stage of ODA allocation, donor self-interest variables, in line with the
eligibility stage, do predominantly have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the allocation of
aid. Aid is positively correlated with the amount of exports to the recipient coun-
try, however, external debt, which played a role in determining whether a country is
eligible to receive aid, displays no signiﬁcance at the level stage. Geographical dis-
tance inﬂuences the amount of aid allocated negatively, whereas, colonial ties as well
as the number of years of development cooperation raise the share of bilateral aid
transfers. Cultural and religious (dis-)similarity, measured by the share of the recip-
ient country’s population that is Christian or Muslim, have the expected signs, that
is positive for similarity and negative for dissimilarity. By controlling for recipient
need variables, more aid is allocated to poorer and more populated countries, even
though evidence exists that there is a large-country bias. Countries which are one
percent larger than others receive only 0.25 percent more aid. Human development
(PQLI) does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the amount of aid allocated, just as it did
24Table 2: OLS: Dependent Variable: Log of ODA, 1992-2003
I II III IV V
Trade 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(6.12) (6.08) (6.05) (5.73) (5.72)
External Debt -0.003 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001
(-0.19) (0.35) (0.24) (0.05) (0.08)
Distance -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(-3.29) (-3.16) (-3.16) (-3.06) (-3.06)
% Christians 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002** 0.002**
(1.76) (1.68) (1.64) (2.01) (1.97)
% Muslims -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002*
(-1.94) (-1.67) (-1.89) (-1.70) (-1.72)
Colonial Ties 1.73*** 1.74*** 1.73*** 1.75*** 1.75***
(6.96) (6.85) (6.82) (7.04) (7.08)
Years of ODA 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(3.56) (3.64) (3.65) (3.48) (3.44)
Population 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(4.49) (4.52) (4.54) (4.52) (4.55)
Income (p.c.) -0.66*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.63***
(-9.06) (-8.81) (-8.76) (-9.26) (-9.25)
PQLI 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(1.03) (0.98) (1.20) (0.79) (0.78)
Democracy 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.01
(1.90) (2.17) (2.23) (1.62) (1.63)
Human Rights 0.02 -0.006 -0.007 0.03 0.03
(0.38) (-0.12) (-0.15) (0.64) (0.64)
Openness -0.05** -0.05** -0.06** -0.04** -0.04**
(-2.31) (-2.67) (-2.91) (-2.26) (-2.27)
Refugee Burden (political) -1.243
(-0.60)
Refugee Burden (economic) 219.5***
(3.32)
Refugee Outﬂow (stock) 12.31*** 12.43***
(2.77) (2.82)
Asylum Applic. (donor) 0.92
(1.28)
Asylum Applic. (recipient) 0.46***
(4.15)
Observations 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257
adj. R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31
Notes: Regressions are run with ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcients of constant are not reported.
The t-values are in parentheses. */**/*** Signiﬁcant at 10%/ 5%/1% level.
not inﬂuence the eligibility of a country to receive aid. Considering good governance
rewarding eﬀects, the results of the eligibility stage are weakly supported. The more
progressed in establishing democratic structures the recipient country is, the higher
the share of aid it receives from bilateral donors. On the other hand, respect for
human rights is insigniﬁcant throughout.
25We ﬁnd strong evidence for our hypothesis that donors use development aid for
migration management purposes. The refugee stock variable is strongly signiﬁcant,
indicating that a refugee outﬂow is of considerable concern for donor countries.
Thus, aid is signiﬁcantly deployed for migration prevention purposes. Furthermore,
the number of asylum applications, indicating the direct bilateral migration pres-
sure towards the donor country, is positive but only signiﬁcant with respect to the
recipient country’s total population. Donor countries tend to transfer more aid to-
wards refugee-sending countries if they are directly aﬀected. The coeﬃcients of the
burden-sharing variables indicate that social or political aspects do not inﬂuence aid
allocation decisions signiﬁcantly, while economic burdens are positively correlated
to the share of aid allocated to the recipient country. This constitutes rather weak
evidence for underlying burden-sharing motivations of ODA allocation decisions of
bilateral donors.
Tables 3 and 4 provide the results for the eligibility and the level stage estimation
of emergency aid. At the level stage the inﬂuence of donor interest variables is less
distinct than at the eligibility stage. We ﬁnd that the bilateral trade volume is in-
signiﬁcant for all level regressions. However, it is signiﬁcant throughout the binary
choice regressions, however, with an unexpected negative sign which contradicts our
assumption that better trade relations inﬂuence the decision on aid allocation posi-
tively. Geographical distance aﬀects both the eligibility and the amounts of received
emergency aid negatively, which reveals bilateral donors pay less attention to more
distant recipient countries in times of humanitarian crises. Cultural similarity shows
ambiguous signiﬁcance, indicating that countries with a high share of Muslim popu-
lation are less eligible to receive emergency aid. However, at the level stage, Muslim
countries are not discriminated against. Former colonial ties seem to be an asset for
receiving emergency aid in times of urgent need. Furthermore, besides the colonial
background, long-lasting bilateral development cooperation between donor and re-
cipient countries is signiﬁcant only for the eligibility stage, not for the scale of aid
transfers. This means that the longer there has been a donor-recipient development
cooperation partnership, the higher the probability also to receive aid for humani-
tarian purposes. Moreover, poorer and larger countries appear to be more eligible
26Table 3: Logit: Dependent Variable: Emergency Aid, 1992-2003
I II III IV V
Trade -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15***
(-15.86) (-14.60) (-14.53) (-15.01) (-14.66)
Distance -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.52*** -0.49***
(-19.71) (-19.40) (-19.39) (-17.71) (-16.61)
% Christians 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.001
(1.54) (2.02) (1.85) (1.26) (1.53)
% Muslims -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002***
(-2.94) (-1.47) (-1.83) (-3.16) (-2.93)
Colonial Ties 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.52***
(7.65) (7.57) (7.55) (7.03) (6.82)
Years of ODA 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(20.71) (21.54) (21.50) (20.28) (20.18)
Population 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20***
(17.87) (16.50) (16.84) (16.70) (15.86)
Income (p.c.) -0.51*** -0.49*** -0.49*** -0.53*** -0.53***
(-19.00) (-17.74) (-18.24) (-19.62) (-19.74)
PQLI 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(12.24) (12.62) (13.02) (12.55) (12.42)
Democracy -0.001 0.005* 0.005** -0.001 -0.001
(-0.34) (1.89) (1.98) (-0.30) (-0.55)
Human Rights 0.39*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.39***
(19.55) (15.15) (15.11) (19.69) (19.08)
Openness -0.001 -0.009 -0.019 -0.001 0.000
(-0.11) (-0.76) (-1.55) (-0.06) (0.00)
Natural Disaster Deaths 1.29*** 1.37*** 1.37*** 1.28*** 1.30***
(5.84) (6.17) (6.19) (5.77) (5.84)
Battle Deaths 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(4.77) (3.00) (3.20) (4.59) (4.51)
Refugee Burden (political) -1.114
(-0.69)
Refugee Burden (economic) 286.8***
(3.65)
Refugee Outﬂow (stock) 40.05*** 39.99***
(13.24) (13.21)
Asylum Applic. (donor) 0.17
(0.88)
Asylum Applic. (recipient) 3.39***
(5.39)
Observations 22655 22655 22655 21801 21801
Log Likelihood -11778.4 -11072.78 -11066.79 -10881.99 -10865.23
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Notes: The z-values are in parentheses. */**/*** Signiﬁcant at 10%/ 5%/1% level.
to receive emergency aid. However, we ﬁnd no evidence to support the assumption
that with increasing human development, the probability for receiving aid decreases.
Quite the contrary, the positive signs indicate that emergency aid is positively cor-
related to higher scores on the PQLI. Democratic structures do not strictly make a
27country more likely to be eligible for receiving emergency assistance, however if eli-
gible, more democratic countries receive more emergency assistance. Humanitarian
catastrophes, either caused by natural disasters or violent conﬂicts, generally initi-
ate solidarity with the aﬀected country. However, donors seem to evaluate victims
of natural disasters diﬀerently from those of violent clashes. Donors are more likely
to assist in natural catastrophes than in violent conﬂicts. However, if donors are
willing to support at all, casualties of violent conﬂicts attract double the attention
of those of natural disasters. Thus, countries with high numbers of battle fatalities
and a low respect for human rights are more eligible for receiving emergency aid.
Thus, human rights violations and violent conﬂicts are not disciplined by reduced
amounts of emergency aid, i.e. compassion seems to dominate reprehension.
At the eligibility stage, we ﬁnd no evidence for a social burden-sharing policy (con-
trolled for by refugees per capita), while the sharing of an economic refugee burden
(controlled for by refugees per GDP) seems to be in the interest of donors. Countries
with a high proportion of refugee emigration are more likely to receive emergency
aid. At least one measure for controlling lobbying activities is signiﬁcant and con-
ﬁrms the respective hypothesis. The more asylum applications that are submitted
bilaterally to the donor country, the more eligible the recipient country becomes for
emergency aid. At the level stage, we ﬁnd strong evidence for both an economic as
well as social and political burden-sharing policy. This indicates that countries with
a high number of refugees either with respect to the size of their own population or
to their own GDP, obtain more aid. Countries of origin tend to receive more aid
when people leave the country. As Czaika (2005) already noted, this might induce
counterproductive incentives, since source countries could be tempted to enhance
refugee ﬂights to attract more emergency aid. Finally, asylum applications display a
positive and signiﬁcant sign. Two explanations for this result are interrelated: ﬁrst,
’information’ about the urgency is transmitted by the numbers of asylum seekers to
the donor country, and that seeks to stabilize the conditions in the source country, so
that voluntary repatriation might become an option. The second explanation states
that asylum seekers proactively lobby the (emergency) aid allocation decision mak-
ing process of the donor (and their host) country for the sake of their compatriots
28Table 4: OLS: Dependent Variable: Log of Emergency Aid, 1992-2003
I II III IV V
Trade -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.92) (-0.80) (-0.86) (-0.82) (-0.86)
Distance -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.16*** -0.17**
(-3.18) (-2.80) (-2.96) (-2.39) (-2.48)
% Christians 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003** 0.003**
(1.65) (1.14) (1.59) (2.31) (2.07)
% Muslims 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.25) (0.17) (0.65) (0.72) (0.54)
Colonial Ties 0.43* 0.40* 0.41** 0.34 0.36
(1.71) (1.84) (2.04) (1.45) (1.39)
Years of ODA -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.44) (0.48) (0.60) (-0.46) (-0.51)
Population 0.001 -0.003 0.03 -0.009 -0.02
(0.02) (-0.05) (0.51) (-0.18) (-0.33)
Income (p.c.) -0.47*** -0.36*** -0.40*** -0.46*** -0.47***
(-6.02) (-4.95) (-5.72) (-6.03) (-6.18)
PQLI 0.006** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.005** 0.005**
(2.43) (2.82) (3.04) (2.02) (2.10)
Democracy 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.009** 0.01**
(2.81) (4.14) (3.90) (2.46) (2.34)
Human Rights 0.59*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.56*** 0.57***
(9.42) (9.17) (9.19) (8.28) (9.06)
Openness 0.05** 0.02 0.01 0.04** 0.04**
(2.32) (0.85) (0.54) (2.11) (2.33)
Natural Disaster Deaths 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11***
(4.22) (4.42) (4.31) (4.14) (4.22)
Battle Deaths 0.20* 0.21* 0.20* 0.19* 0.19*
(1.78) (1.87) (1.81) (1.70) (1.73)
Refugee Burden (political) 9.58***
(2.86)
Refugee Burden (economic) 277.8**
(2.11)
Refugee Outﬂow (stock) 36.98*** 36.66***
(5.66) (5.62)
Asylum Applic. (donor) 6.64***
(2.66)
Asylum Applic. (recipient) 4.39***
(6.79)
Observations 1064 1064 1064 1058 1058
adj. R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25
Notes: Regressions are run with ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcients of constant are not reported.
The t-values are in parentheses. */**/*** Signiﬁcant at 10%/ 5%/1% level.
(Mayer and Raimondos-Møller 2003).
29Table 5: Average refugee burden of 18 donor countries, 1992-2003
Country Group Average burden Country Group Average burden
Switzerland 1 0.3453 Canada 2 0.0986
Sweden 1 0.2691 United Kingdom 2 0.0795
Netherlands 1 0.2198 France 3 0.0519
Belgium 1 0.2128 Australia 3 0.0465
Germany 1 0.1994 Finland 3 0.0383
Austria 1 0.1904 United States 3 0.0315
Denmark 1 0.1902 Spain 3 0.0203
Norway 1 0.1813 Italy 3 0.0157
Ireland 2 0.1222 Japan none 0.0001
Notes: Own calculations, refugee data from UNHCR (2005).
4.3 Robustness
The sensitivity of the preceding results is analyzed by changing some model speci-
ﬁcations.21 Firstly, the good governance variables democracy and human rights are
replaced by the Freedom House variable on civil and political rights, which is highly
correlated to both variables.22 However, this alters only slightly the previous ﬁnd-
ings, and the evidence for altruistic burden-sharing policies by allocating emergency
aid primarily to refugee-hosting countries does not change. For the allocation of
ODA, the estimation results do not vary by exchanging the variables. Secondly, we
group the donors into three classes according to their average refugee burden. This
is measured by the number of asylum applications claimed to a donor country di-
vided by its population, and taking the average of the period 1992 to 2003. Average
burdens and group classiﬁcations of the countries are depicted in Table 5.
Japan was not included, since its average burden covers less than one percent of
Italy’s, the country with the second lowest average burden. The emergency aid
estimation results for the ﬁrst group of donors, that is those with a relatively high
average refugee burden, shows that, except for the variable on social and political
burdens, all other refugee-related variables stay signiﬁcant. The second group of
countries with medium refugee burdens, display insigniﬁcance for economic burdens,
while social and political burdens are alleviated through higher amounts of aid.
21Throughout this analysis, emphasis is put on the level stage rather than on the eligibility stage.
22The results of these regressions are available on request.
30Additionally, the asylum applications variable (donor) becomes insigniﬁcant. The
third group, with a relatively small refugee burden in terms of submitted asylum
applications, also exhibits insigniﬁcance towards social and political burdens. At
the same time, the asylum application variable (recipient), which reﬂects a bilateral
migration pressure on the donor country, also becomes insigniﬁcant. This robustness
check suggests that the refugee stock variable is the only determinant for emergency
aid allocations independent of diﬀering model speciﬁcations, whereas signiﬁcance
levels of the other variables diﬀer between the donor groups. For the grouped ODA
allocation estimations, two major diﬀerences in the results emerge. In the ﬁrst two
groups, social and political burdens of refugee-hosting recipient countries are taken
into account, whereas the results for donors with lower refugee burdens stay in line
with the previous outcome. The variable testing for the economic burden remains
unchanged. The second major diﬀerence is the signiﬁcance of the asylum application
(donor) variable, which is now positively correlated with the amount of allocated
aid.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the eﬀects of refugee movements on the allocation of hu-
manitarian and development aid of bilateral donors. Until now, the aid allocation
literature does not treat this question. Increasing refugee inﬂows and outﬂows, par-
ticularly within the most fragile regions of the developing world, highlight the need
of both sending and hosting countries for international support. Generally, two ap-
proaches for international support of ﬁrst asylum countries are discussed: ﬁnancial
and physical burden-sharing. While the latter is not part of the present analysis,
ﬁnancial (humanitarian and development) aid is of great importance to alleviate the
burdens of refugee-hosting developing countries. By linking the two subjects, we
investigate if and how refugee movements inﬂuence the aid allocation decisions of
bilateral donors and test possible underlying motivations. Our results indicate that
refugee movements generally inﬂuence the allocation of bilateral aid, though the mo-
tives of aid allocation vary. The outcomes suggest that the allocation of emergency
aid is inﬂuenced by both economic and social needs of conﬂict-neighboring ﬁrst
31asylum countries, whereas, development aid is more focused on the economic rather
than on the social and political needs of a refugee-hosting country. Thus, developing
countries experiencing large refugee burdens expressed by the number of refugees
in comparison to their own population, receive a higher share of emergency aid. A
greater amount of development and emergency aid is also allocated to those recipient
countries with a high economic burden placed upon them by hosting refugees. Thus,
there is strong evidence for an (implicit) economic burden-sharing policy of bilateral
donors. Secondly, our results indicate that source countries receive a larger amounts
of aid, the more refugees left the country. This seems to reﬂect a migration preven-
tive policy which intends to tackle the root causes of refugee ﬂights. This mirrors the
belief of policy-makers, probably based on the results of earlier studies, that aid has
a positive impact on development, although no or less impact on political situations.
Donor governments seem to expect that the alleviation of economic hardship will
decrease the incentives for further refugee outﬂows and increase repatriation willing-
ness of refugees. The present study provides evidence for such migration prevention
interests of bilateral donors. Furthermore, these results indicate that such source
country-oriented policies, aimed to the root causes of emigration, might be caused
endogenously through the presence of a signiﬁcant asylum population in the donor
country who invests in lobby activities for their home country in conﬂict. Asylum
migration is then an instrument for transmitting information about urgencies which
leads to a measurable response of donor governments towards these refugee-sending
countries.
A The truthful equilibrium
Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) remark, that the present model can have mul-





a), in which u∗
a2 is the equilibrium per-capita utility level of the
native population. The political equilibrium is then characterized by the truthful
contribution schedules chosen by the native population
ca(µa,u
∗
a2) = max(0,Ωa), (A-1)
32where Ωa is deﬁned in
u
∗
a2 = Va2[¯ Ya2 +
(1 − µa)Ta − Ωa
La2
]. (A-2)
The truthful contribution schedule is never negative and is set to the level of com-
pensating variation relative to the equilibrium utility level of the natives. Thus, the
natives oﬀer exactly the contribution that will keep them at the same equilibrium
utility level for all policy parameters µ of the government. The optimal allocation
of aid chosen by the recipient government is given by
µ
∗




a2) + (La1ua1 + La2u
∗
a2)}. (A-3)
Given that the government acts after the native lobbyists, it takes the utility level
of the natives as given and chooses its optimal policy parameter. The utility level








where µx is deﬁned by
µx = arg max
µ
{La1ua1(µ) + La2ua2(µ)}. (A-5)
B Deﬁnitions and source of regression variables
ODA Log of ODA as share of total aid, ODA in Mio. USD (Prices
2002) from OECD/DAC.
EMA Log of emergency aid per capita, emergency aid in Mio. USD
(Prices 2002) from OECD/DAC.
Population Log of population in Mio. from World Bank.
Trade Log of bilateral trade as share of total exports from OECD.
Openness Log of Imports and Exports as ratio of GDP from WTO.
Years of ODA Number of Years received ODA since 1960 or Independence.
Distance Log of distance between the two most important agglomer-
ations from CEPII.
External debt Log of external debt as ratio of GDP from Joint Database
of BIS, IMF, OECD and World Bank.
Human Rights Human rights score, scaled from 1 (secure rule of law) to 5
(terror encompassing the whole population) from University
of North Carolina.
Income (p.c.) Log of GDP per capita in current USD (PPP) from World
Bank.
Democracy Polity IV Project Index ranging from -10 (High Autocracy)
to +10 (High Democracy) from CIDCM.
33PQLI Composite index of literacy rate, infant mortality rate, and
life expectancy at birth, raw data from World Bank.
Civil/Political Rights Average of Civil and Political Rights Index from Freedom
House.
Colonial Ties Dummy set one if recipient was a colony of a donor country.
% Christians Share of Christian population from World Christian
Database.
% Muslims Share of Muslim population from World Christian Database.
Natural Disaster Deaths Deaths per capita induced by natural catastrophes from
OFDA/CRED.
Battle Deaths Annual battle fatalities per capita from PRIO.
Refugee Stock (COO) Number of refugees per population of the country of origin
from UNHCR.
Refugee Burden (p.c.) Number of refugees per population of the refugee hosting
country from UNHCR.
Refugee Burden(GDP) Stock of hosted refugees as ratio to GDP from UNHCR.
Asylum Appl. (Donor) Number of asylum applications registered in the donor coun-
try per capita of its population from UNHCR.
Asylum Appl. (Recipient) Number of asylum applications registered in donor country
per capita of the source country from UNHCR.
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